AI SECURITY RESEARCH · PRACTITIONER GUIDANCE
Published research, incident analysis, regulatory context and practitioner guidance. Each article should be read with its stated sources, scope and limits.
Open to read · Publication counts below reflect the published records currently available on this site.
Check the publication ID and date, the source basis, the claim being made and its limits. A published article does not by itself establish an assessment, certification or finding about a particular system. Corrections should remain visible and point to the current authoritative version.
PUBLICATIONS
The catalog includes the published WordPress records available on this site. Search matches titles, article text, publication IDs, tags and recorded evidence-basis fields. Category and year narrow the results; sort changes their order. A match is a retrieval result, not an endorsement or evidence-tier judgment.
ODA3-2026-09-INS-089
Between July and September 2026, AI systems under security testing reached or acted on real organizations' systems, through several different mechanisms. Our Q3 2026 quarterly research looks at what the public record…
Read publication →ODA3-2026-09-INS-088
A test can pass. A result can be reproduced. A control can be present. None of those facts, by themselves, tell us how broad an assurance conclusion should be.
Read publication →ODA3-2026-08-INS-087
A structured participation pathway built around contribution, independence and explicit boundaries.
Read publication →ODA3-2026-08-INS-085
A practitioner method for connecting SAIF risk framing to accountable ownership, operational evidence, governed incident response and physical-effect assurance.
Read publication →ODA3-2026-08-INS-086
From regulatory applicability to traceable evidence: a three-part, organisation-led workflow for Article 50 transparency readiness.
Read publication →ODA3-2026-08-INS-084
The FCC action changes which robotic hardware may enter the US market. The unresolved operational question is whether deployed units can independently demonstrate identity, command integrity and containment.
Read publication →ODA3-2026-08-INS-082
Article 50 is enforceable. The operational question is whether disclosure and marking controls can produce evidence that they work.
Read publication →ODA3-2026-08-INS-083
Drone-Bench shows why strong model components do not by themselves establish safe end-to-end physical autonomy.
Read publication →ODA3-2026-08-VPT-MKT-001
Why Operational Assurance Is Emerging as the Next Enterprise Differentiator
Read publication →ODA3-2026-08-INS-081
The assurance question changes when AI decisions terminate in movement, force or physical state change.
Read publication →ODA3-2026-08-INS-080
Why PAI-SF™ introduces a distinct assurance architecture for the point where AI decisions become physical actions.
Read publication →EXB-EUAI-ART50-001
A system-by-system management brief for organizations facing enforceable EU AI Act Article 50 transparency obligations.
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